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RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS
MATTHEW S. MULQUEENt
INTRODUCTION
On December 12, 2006, the Department of Homeland
Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("DHS ICE")
swept up over 12,000 meatpacking workers1 in the largest
immigration raid in the Nation's history. 2 While Secretary of
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff praised the raids as part of
the Nation's comprehensive plan to combat illegal immigration
and bolster national security,3 many observers denounced the
suspect manner in which they were carried out 4 and the
t J.D. Candidate, June 2009, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2006,
Wesleyan University.
1 Press Release, United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Workers Sue
To Stop Mass Arrests and Detentions by Federal Agents (Sept. 12, 2007)
[hereinafter Workers Sue To Stop Mass Arrests], http://www.ufcw.org/press-room/
index.cfm?pressReleaseID=349. Only 1,282 of these people, however, were actually
arrested; only sixty-five of those arrested were cited for identity theft, the proffered
basis for the raids. See Julia Preston, Immigrants' Families Figuring Out What To
Do After Federal Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at A13; Workers Sue To Stop
Mass Arrests, supra.
2 See Dianne Solis, Trying To Comply Might Not Cut It for Businesses, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 14, 2006, at 21A.
3 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Remarks by Sec'y of
Homeland Sec. Michael Chertoff, Immigration & Customs Enforcement Assistant
Sec'y Julie Myers, & Fed. Trade Comm'n Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras at a
Press Conference on Operation Wagon Train (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Remarks
on Operation Wagon Train], http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr-1166047951514.
shtm. Secretary Chertoff set the context by reminding the audience that illegally
obtained documents "are used by terrorists who want to get on airplanes" and
"criminals who want to prey on our citizens." Id. Chertoff later remarked that
"[w]hile this theft is not, in itself, related to national security, the issue of fraudulent
identification is one which, as the 9/11 Commission recognized, poses a homeland
security challenge." Id.
4 See Greg Aamot, Worthington Workers Sue over Tactics in Immigration Raid,
MINN. PUB. RADIO, Sept. 4, 2007, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/
09/04/swiftraidlawsuit/ (noting allegations of "abusive and illegal tactics" during the
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community and family fractures that followed. 5 In September of
2007, the United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union ("UFCW") filed a class action suit on behalf of its members
against DHS and ICE, alleging pervasive Fourth Amendment
violations and seeking an injunction against future illegal
workplace raids.6
Illegal aliens were not the only alleged victims. Michael
Graves, for example-a twenty-one year veteran of the plant and
a lifelong American citizen-was held in handcuffs for eight
hours and quizzed on how to get from Iowa to Mississippi; ICE
denied some workers access to counsel, food, and bathrooms, and
physically abused others. 7
The Swift Raids underscore both the scale of the current
immigration problem and the detrimental effect that overzealous
enforcement of immigration laws can have on undocumented
aliens and American citizens. Such concerns are not limited to
the workplace: Automobile stops by state and local police
officers8 as well as roving federal border patrols, 9 large-scale
home raids targeting ethnic communities, 10 and the use of
immigration laws to fight the war on terror have exposed large
numbers of people-particularly ethnic and racial minorities-to
raids, including racial insults hurled at Hispanic workers).
5 Judy Keen, Effects of Raid Still Felt in Iowa Town, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 2007,
at 3A; see also Preston, supra note 1 (noting "the sadness, the emptiness, [and] the
fear" pervading the affected communities, and the difficult decisions faced by
deported parents in leaving behind their legal resident children).
6 See Original Complaint at 2, United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union
v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 4825029 (N.D. Tex. filed Sept. 12, 2007) (No. 07 Civ. 188);
Workers Sue To Stop Mass Arrests, supra note 1.
7 See Complaint at 3-7, United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 2007
WL 4825029 (No. 07 Civ. 188); Mark Gruenberg, UFCW, Workers Sue to Stop Mass
Immigration Raids, WORKDAY MINN., Sept. 12, 2007, http://www.workday
minnesota.org/index.php?news 6 3279.
8 See Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523,
528-30 (6th Cir. 2002).
9 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-84 (1975).
10 See Nina Bernstein, U.S. Raid on Immigrant Household Deepens Anger and
Mistrust on L.I., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2007, at B1 (describing an early morning raid
on a Hispanic family's home that contained no illegal immigrants, but had drawn
complaints of "noise, trash and traffic" from neighbors in the "wealthy beachfront
community"); Editorial, Raids Promise To Make Bad Immigration Situation Worse,
THE TENNESSEAN, Aug. 21, 2007, (Online Ed.) (on file author) [hereinafter Raids
Make Bad Situation Worse] (describing raids by federal and local officials on
Hispanic-populated trailer parks).
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constitutional violations.11 Finding the proper balance between
our territorial response to the other and our engrained loyalty to
core constitutional values is hardly a new problem in American
society.12 As the number of illegal immigrants in the country
continues to grow,13 however, finding a reasonable solution to the
problem has become ever more pertinent.
While most agree that law enforcement officials should
adhere to constitutional mandates, many disagree on how best to
deter violations. The exclusionary rule, for example, has
garnered both praise and criticism 14 since the Supreme Court
first adopted it for federal law enforcement officers in 1914.15 In
criminal trials, the rule generally forbids the introduction of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in order
to prove a defendant's guilt. 16 In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,17
however, the Supreme Court declared that the rule would no
11 This Note assumes, for the purpose of arguing that the exclusionary rule
should apply in removal proceedings, that the Fourth Amendment applies to
resident aliens in the United States. Recently, however, the Court has cast some
doubt on this assumption. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 272
(1990). While a full argument is beyond the scope of this Note, this author believes
that the Fourth Amendment does apply to resident aliens. For a more detailed
analysis of the issues involved, see Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100
YALE L.J. 909, 990 (1991) (describing "Chief Justice Rehnquist's sudden discovery-
fortunately tentative, in dictum, and not speaking for a majority of the Court-that
newly arrived aliens may not be included among the 'people'"); Michael
Scaperlanda, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Aliens: To What Extent Do
They Survive United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez?, 56 Mo. L. REV. 213, 241 (1991).
12 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (upholding the
exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry-including American citizens-from a
military zone on the Pacific Coast during World War II); Jennifer M. Chac6n,
Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security,
39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1832-33 (2007) (discussing the Chinese Exclusion Act as an
early example of the sometimes "virulent aspects of U.S. immigration policy").
13 See MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2006 2-3 (2007), http://www.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ill-pe-2006.pdf (noting that the
unauthorized alien population rose by an annual average of 515,000 between 2000
and 2006).
14 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590-92 (2006) (describing the Court's
changing views on the rule); Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure
Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 119 n.1 (2003) (listing a
sampling of the "vast literature" on the exclusionary rule).
15 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
16 The Exclusionary Rule, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 186, 186-87
(2006).
17 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
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longer apply to civil deportation proceedings.18 While many have
criticized the decision, 19 the exclusionary rule has remained
relegated to the sidelines during the past two decades, fostering
an environment in which immigration officials may purposefully
violate the Fourth Amendment in order to secure an alien's
removal. 20
This Note argues that vast changes in the immigration laws
since 1984 necessitate an examination of Lopez-Mendoza's cost-
benefit analysis, leading to the readoption of the exclusionary
rule in removal proceedings. 2' Part I examines the rule's history,
including the dual reasoning behind the judicially created
deterrent and its application in deportation proceedings. While
the Court's early decisions discussed the rule as an integral part
of the Fourth Amendment, subsequent cases have exhibited a
more cautious assessment of its worth. This assessment weighs
the likelihood of deterring illegal searches and seizures against
the social costs of excluding probative evidence in light of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the procedure in question.
Lopez-Mendoza, for example, decided that the rule's costs
outweighed its benefits after examining immigration
enforcement and deportation as they existed in 1984.
is As Justice White noted in his dissent, "[p]rior to the decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals in [In re] Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 ([B.I.A.] 1979), neither
the Board nor any court had held that the exclusionary rule did not apply in civil
deportation proceedings." Id. at 1058 (White, J., dissenting). Indeed, the major
treatise on immigration law had informed practitioners that the exclusionary rule
was available to their clients, id. at 1059, and the Supreme Court had stated in
dictum that evidence obtained illegally by the Labor Department could not be used
in deportation proceedings, see id. at 1041 (majority opinion); see also United States
ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923) ("It may be assumed that
evidence obtained by the Department through an illegal search and seizure cannot
be made the basis of a finding in deportation proceedings.").
19 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.7(f) (4th ed. 2004) (describing the cost-benefit analysis used by the
majority as "extreme and fundamentally unsound"); Judy C. Wong, Note, Egregious
Fourth Amendment Violations and the Use of the Exclusionary Rule in Deportation
Hearings: The Need for Substantive Equal Protection Rights for Undocumented
Immigrants, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 431, 444 (1997) ("The Supreme Court's
cost-benefit analysis in Lopez-Mendoza has been roundly criticized.").
20 See Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment,
55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 394-95 (2003).
21 In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
conflated exclusion and deportation into a single removal proceeding. A "removable"
alien thus refers to an alien who is either inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 or
deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (2000).
1160 [Vol. 82:1157
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Part II of this Note describes two significant and interrelated
changes to the immigration landscape since the Court's decision:
the criminalization of immigration law and the increasing
involvement of state and local officials in immigration
enforcement. In contrast to the Lopez-Mendoza court's
characterization of deportation as a "purely civil action,"22
removal proceedings have become increasingly punitive over the
past two decades. This development is characteristic of
immigration enforcement generally, which has taken on a "zero-
tolerance" approach as the political dialogue has conflated
criminal and immigration matters. The tragic events of
September 11, 2001, hastened this transformation, heightening
security concerns and changing the public's perception of aliens.
The most recent manifestation of this shift is the enforcement of
immigration law by state and local officials-both at the federal
government's request and on localities' own initiatives. This new
immigration system has exposed illegal aliens, legal aliens, and
U.S. citizens to a heightened risk of constitutional violations.
Immigration enforcement is a much different animal than its
1984 ancestor, suggesting a reassessment of the constitutional
safeguards that the Court deemed adequate over twenty years
ago. Part III walks through an analysis of the exclusionary rule's
deterrence benefits and social costs in light of the current state of
immigration. While the rule does impose some costs, the
likelihood of deterrence-and the resulting promise of liberty for
aliens and citizens alike-tip the scales in favor of readopting the
exclusionary rule in removal proceedings.
I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS, AND
INS v. LOPEZ-MENDOZA
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created evidentiary
doctrine designed to deter Fourth Amendment violations by
prohibiting the admission of illegally obtained evidence at trial. 23
While the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly mention
exclusion, some view the rule as a natural extension of the
amendment's protection "against unreasonable searches and
seizures."24 Others question the rule's necessity and usefulness. 25
22 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038.
23 The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 16, at 186-87.
24 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 930-38
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A proper understanding of the broad purposes
20081 1161
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Despite continued debate, it remains entrenched in criminal
procedure and certain non-criminal venues. 26 Although the rule's
purpose is not to vindicate the violation of an individual right, a
defendant must have suffered a constitutional violation in order
to challenge the introduction of illegally obtained evidence. 27 A
challenge typically takes the form of a pretrial motion to
suppress: If the defendant's motion is successful, evidence
determined to be the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation is
rendered inadmissible at trial.28 Improperly admitted evidence
may require reversal. 29
A. Evolution of the Exclusionary Doctrine
The Supreme Court's early decisions established the rule as
a means of deterring unlawful police activity and upholding
judicial integrity. The Court first applied the rule to federal law
enforcement officials in Weeks v. United States.30 To admit
evidence obtained in violation of the law, the Court remarked,
would "affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an
open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution."3 1 Such
neglect would effectively siphon all value from the Fourth
Amendment by hollowing out its promise of protection. 32 Belief
in the rule's value carried over to Mapp v. Ohio,33 which extended
the rule to illegal searches and seizures by state officials. 34
"Nothing," opined the Court, "can destroy a government more
sought to be served by the Fourth Amendment demonstrates that the principles
embodied in the exclusionary rule rest upon a far firmer constitutional foundation
than the shifting sands of the Court's deterrence rationale."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 657 (1961) ("[T]he exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments ....").
25 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV.
757, 785-800 (1994).
26 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[T]he continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined in our
precedents, is not in doubt."); United States v. $557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S.
Funds, 287 F.3d 66, 80 (2d Cir. 2002) (forfeiture case); People v. Marsh (In re
Marsh), 237 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ill. 1968) (juvenile delinquency proceeding); LAFAVE,
supra note 19 (various administrative proceedings).
27 The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 16, at 187.
28 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(c); LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 1.6(a).
29 The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 16, at 187.
30 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
31 Id. at 394.
32 See id. at 393.
33 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34 See id. at 655.
[Vol. 82:11571162
RETHINKING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence."35 Judicial integrity
and institutional self-preservation were not the only driving
forces behind the Court's opinion, though; the rule was also
needed "to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it."36
Mapp's expansive language soon gave way to a more tailored
interpretation, shifting focus from "the imperative of judicial
integrity" 37 to the rule's deterrent effect. In United States v.
Calandra,38 for example, the Court introduced a simple balancing
test to determine whether to apply the rule to witness testimony
before a grand jury based on evidence obtained from an illegal
search. 39 The Court weighed the "potential injury to the historic
role and functions of the grand jury against the potential benefits
of the rule," finding that it would have an "uncertain" and
"incremental deterrent effect."40 The majority's curt treatment of
judicial integrity41 foreshadowed the adoption of an explicit
deterrence-based balancing test in United States v. Janis.42
Reaffirming that the "prime purpose of the rule, if not the sole
one," was deterrence, 43 the Court applied the test to federal civil
tax proceedings and found that the social costs imposed by
exclusion outweighed the small likelihood of deterring illegal
conduct.44 This balancing test would be applied to deportation
proceedings several years later in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza.
B. Suppressing Evidence in Deportation Proceedings
1. The Mechanics of Deportation
Before an alien can move to suppress evidence, he or she
must be summoned to a removal hearing by a notice to appear. 45
35 Id. at 659.
36 Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
37 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
38 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
39 See id. at 348-49.
40 Id. at 349, 351.
41 See id. at 355 n.11.
42 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
43 Id. at 446 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44 See id. at 454.
45 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2000).
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This written notice describes the nature of the proceeding, the
alleged violations of law, the charges against the alien, the time
and place at which the proceedings will occur, and the
consequences of failing to appear.46 An immigration judge may
remove an alien for any of the reasons enumerated in
8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a), such as illegal presence, disregarding a
condition of entry, committing a crime of moral turpitude, failing
to register under the Alien Registration Act, or falsifying
documents.47 Aliens have the "privilege"48 of representation by
counsel during removal proceedings, and they receive a
"reasonable opportunity" to examine the evidence against them,
present evidence on their own behalf, and cross-examine
witnesses proffered by the government. 49 While the Federal
Rules of Evidence do not apply to removal proceedings, aliens are
entitled to due process.50
An alien's burden of proof depends on whether the
government has charged an alien with inadmissibility or
deportability. An alien who enters the U.S. without inspection,
for example, is considered an applicant for admission-as if he or
she was still at the border. An admitted alien who violates the
law, on the other hand, is considered deportable. 51 An applicant
for admission must prove that he or she "is clearly and beyond
doubt entitled to be admitted and is not inadmissible." 52  An
admitted alien, on the other hand, has the burden of establishing
by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is legally present
in the country.5 3
46 Id. § 1229(a)(1)(A)-(G).
47 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1)-(3) (West 2007).
48 Note that this is not a right. See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social
Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases,
113 HARv. L. REV. 1889, 1896 n.37 (2000) ("Courts have invariably held that there is
no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in deportation proceedings. Due process,
however, has sometimes been held to require counsel as a matter of 'fundamental
fairness.'" (citations omitted)).
49 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A)-(B) (2000).
5o See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("[T]he Due Process Clause
applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."); Ezeagwuna v.
Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405-06 (3d Cir. 2003).
51 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(2); Ortega-Cervantes v.
Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007).
52 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A).
53 Id. § 1229a(c)(2)(B).
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The government's burden of proof also varies by charge.
When an applicant for admission fails to make the required
showing, the government need not prove anything. When the
government attempts to remove an admitted alien, the
government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the alien is deportable. 54 The immigration judge can order an
alien removed only after the government meets this burden, with
"reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence" produced at the
hearing. 55  In all removal proceedings, however, DHS must
initially establish alienage by clear and convincing evidence,
which shifts the burden to the individual to prove time, place,
and manner of entry.56 Officers typically record evidence of
alienage and deportability gathered during an arrest in a Form I-
213, Record of Deportable Alien.57 A victim of an illegal search
and seizure will therefore seek to preclude this form's entry into
proceedings, along with any other evidence discovered through a
constitutional violation.
2. Suppression of Evidence Before INS v. Lopez-Mendoza
Prior to 1979, practitioners and courts agreed that the
exclusionary rule applied to deportation proceedings. While the
Supreme Court had not ruled conclusively on the issue, it had
"assumed" in United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod 58 that
illegally seized evidence could not be introduced. 59 Lower courts
had generally followed suit. In Ex parte Jackson,60 for example,
an employer who was unhappy with his unionizing workers
found some "federal agents" to help him raid their union hall.6 1
"[W]ithout warrant or process," the agents destroyed property,
beat and insulted the workers and their families, and generally
"perpetrated a reign of terror, violence, and crime against citizen
54 Id. § 1229a(c)(3)(A).
55 Id. § 1229a(c)(1)(A), (3)(A); see also Duvall v. Attorney Gen., 436 F.3d. 382,
388 (3d Cir. 2006).
56 See 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000); Murphy v. INS, 54 F.3d 605, 608-09 (9th Cir.
1995); In re Benitez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 173, 176-77 (B.I.A. 1984) (establishing that
admission of foreign birth proves alienage and shifts the burden to the alien to prove
time, place, and manner of entry).
57 See Martinez-Camargo v. INS, 282 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2002).
58 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
59 See id. at 155.
60 263 F. 110 (D. Mont. 1920).
61 See id. at 111-12.
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and alien alike."62 Because the manner in which the evidence
was seized violated the Fourth Amendment, the petitioner's
subsequent deportation proceeding was found to be "unfair and
invalid."63
The exclusionary rule enjoyed a few more decades of
similarly enthusiastic treatment and unquestioned acceptance 64
before the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") decided In re
Sandoval, a case involving a warrantless search of an alien's
dwelling. 65 Despite the rule's assumed applicability, as well as a
contemporary circuit court case strongly supporting exclusion,66
the BIA applied the Calandra and Janis balancing test. A three-
member majority of the Board concluded that the costs of
suppressing probative evidence outweighed the "remote
likelihood" that the rule would have any deterrent effect and held
that it would not apply in civil deportation proceedings. 67
3. The Death of the Exclusionary Rule
Five years later, the issue reached the Supreme Court in two
consolidated appeals from the Ninth Circuit. In 1976, INS
agents targeted a transmission repair shop in California on an
informant's tip.68 The shop's owner confronted the agents, who
did not have a warrant, and refused to let them enter the shop to
interrogate his employees. 69 While one agent talked to the
owner, another slipped inside and questioned employee Adan
Lopez-Mendoza. 70 After Lopez-Mendoza admitted he was from
62 Id.
63 Id. at 112-13 ("The Declaration of Independence, the writings of the fathers,
the Revolution, the Constitution, and the Union, all were inspired to overthrow and
prevent like governmental despotism. They are yet living, vital, and potential forces
to those ends, to safeguard all domiciled in the country, alien as well as citizen.").
64 See In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 74 (B.I.A. 1979) ("It is
undisputed... that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures applies in deportation proceedings, and that evidence obtained
as the result of an unlawful search cannot be used." (quoting CHARLES GORDON &
HARRY N. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 5-31 (rev. ed. 1977))).
65 See id. at 73-74.
66 See Wong Chung Che v. INS, 565 F.2d 166, 169 (1st Cir. 1977) ("There is no
doubt that, if the landing permit was obtained through an illegal search, its
admission into evidence infected the deportation proceeding."); Sandoval, 17 I. & N.
Dec. at 75 (citing Wong Chung Che, 565 F.2d 166).
67 See Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 70-71.
68 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1035 (1984).
69 See id.
70 See id.
1166 [Vol. 82:1157
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Mexico, the agent arrested him. 71 One year later, in a separate
mass raid at a potato processing plant in Pasco, Washington, INS
agents stationed themselves at the plant's entrance during a
shift change and picked out suspicious-looking individuals who
could not answer their questions in English.7 2  The agents
arrested Elias Sandoval-Sanchez along with thirty-six of his
coworkers.73
Both men elected formal deportation hearings and alleged
Fourth Amendment violations. The Immigration Judges in both
cases nevertheless found them deportable, and the men appealed
to the BIA.74 In both cases the BIA relied on Sandoval to rule
that the illegality of an arrest had no bearing on a subsequent
deportation hearing, and declined to apply the exclusionary
rule.75  Both appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, vacated Lopez-Mendoza's deportation
order for a determination of whether his Fourth Amendment
rights had been violated; 76 the Court similarly reversed
Sandoval-Sanchez's deportation order, finding that he had
suffered a Fourth Amendment violation and holding that the
exclusionary rule therefore applied. 77
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
Ninth Circuit in a 5-4 decision, holding that the exclusionary rule
did not apply in deportation proceedings. 7 As the BIA had
predicted five years earlier,79 the Court employed the Calandra
and Janis cost-benefit test. Justice O'Connor began by
emphasizing the "purely civil" and "streamlined" nature of
deportation hearings, which required less constitutional
protection than criminal proceedings.80  Before reaching the
merits of exclusion, though, the Court disposed of Lopez-
Mendoza's appeal, stating that "[t]he 'body' or identity of a
defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never
71 See id.
72 See id. at 1036-37.
73 See id. at 1037.
74 See id. at 1035-38.
75 See id. at 1036, 1038.
76 See id. at 1034-36.
77 See id. at 1038.
78 See id. at 1034, 1051.
79 See In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 76 (B.I.A. 1979).
80 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038-39.
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itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest."8 1  Since
Lopez-Mendoza had objected only to his forced physical
appearance at his deportation hearing-not to the evidence
offered against him-the illegality of his arrest had no effect on
the proceeding.8 2 Since Sandoval-Sanchez's case suffered no such
infirmities, the Court turned to Janis and Calandra to weigh the
costs and benefits of exclusion in the immigration context.
The majority first analyzed the rule's social benefits and
found the value of deterrence "difficult to assess. 8 3 On the one
hand, the majority recognized that the rule was most likely to
deter when an officer's primary objective was obtaining evidence
for use in the proceeding in question-the exact situation before
the Court.8 4 Four other factors, on the other hand, lessened the
rule's deterrence value. First, the Court noted that immigration
officials must often only prove alienage in order to meet their
burden in deportation proceedings. Since this was sometimes
possible to prove without resorting to evidence obtained from an
arrest, the majority thought that suppression would not be at the
forefront of officers' minds.8 5 Second, the majority noted that
over 97.5% of arrested aliens chose voluntary departure without
a formal hearing, further decreasing the likelihood that officers
would conform their conduct in anticipation of exclusion. 6
Third-and "perhaps most important"-the majority stated that
the INS's "own comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth
Amendment violations" was a sufficient guard against unlawful
conduct.8 7  Lastly, alternative remedies existed for checking
potential INS misconduct, including the possibility of civil suits.8 8
The exclusionary rule, therefore, was "unlikely to provide
significant, much less substantial, additional deterrence. '8 9
The Court measured this minimal deterrence value against
suppression's "unusual and significant" social costs in the
81 Id. at 1039-40.
82 Id. at 1040. But see id. at 1052 n.1 (White, J., dissenting) ("I.. question the
Court's finding that Lopez.Mendoza failed to object to admission of the evidence.").
83 See id. at 1041-42 (majority opinion).
84 See id. at 1042-43.
85 See id. at 1043.
86 See id. at 1044.
87 See id. at 1044-45.
88 See id. at 1045.
89 Id. at 1046 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976)).
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immigration context. 90 First, the majority noted that prohibiting
probative evidence "would require the courts to close their eyes to
ongoing violations of the law"-an outcome that the Court "ha[d]
never before accepted."91 Second, apparently contradicting its
earlier statement that immigration officers received sufficient
investigatory training, the Court stated that officers' and
attorneys' lack of familiarity with the "intricacies of Fourth
Amendment law" would complicate the "streamlined" nature of
deportation hearings, 92 divert attention from the "main issues" to
be resolved,93 and "result in the suppression of' lawfully obtained
evidence. 94 Lastly, enforcement officers were simply too busy
scooping up large numbers of illegal aliens to be expected to
compile detailed reports of every encounter or to testify that they
complied with the Fourth Amendment. 95 Finding that these
costs outweighed any deterrence the rule provided, the majority
concluded that "[t]here comes a point at which courts, consistent
with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create
barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role
that is properly the duty of the Executive and Legislative
Branches."96
A plurality of the Court added two codas. 97 First, Justice
O'Connor stated that the Court's opinion about the "rule's value
might change, if there developed good reason to believe that
Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were
widespread. ' 98  Second, she noted that the Court was not
currently considering "egregious violations of Fourth Amendment
or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental
fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence
obtained."99
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See id. at 1048.
93 See id. (quoting In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 80 (B.I.A. 1979)).
94 See id. at 1049.
95 See id.
96 Id. at 1050 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459 (1976)).
97 Chief Justice Burger joined in all but Part V of the opinion. Id. at 1034 n.**.
99 Id. at 1050.
99 Id. at 1050-51.
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4. Post-Lopez-Mendoza Developments
In the years following Lopez-Mendoza, courts followed the
decision's main thrust while grappling with this "egregious"
exception-including whether it was an exception at all. In
Adamson v. Commissioner,100 the Ninth Circuit held that it was,
reasoning that Lopez-Mendoza had left some leeway for the
circuits to safeguard "judicial integrity." 101 The contours of the
exception were fleshed out in Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS. 0 2 The
court held that all "bad faith violation[s] of an individual's
[F]ourth [A]mendment rights"-including stops based solely on a
person's race-were "sufficiently egregious" to trigger
exclusion.103 The court also clarified that an egregious violation
could be found either if it "transgresse[d] notions of fundamental
fairness" or "undermine[d] the [evidence's] probative value."10 4
Lastly, in Orhorhaghe v. INS, 0 5 the Ninth Circuit expanded the
holding to include stops based solely on an alien's foreign-
sounding name.'0 6 Several circuits have subsequently adopted
an "egregious" exception to the Lopez-Mendoza rule, 0 7 with at
least one circuit concurring with the Ninth Circuit's race-
conscious definition. 08
While these cases are theoretically good news for aliens who
are stopped on the basis of race-at least in some circuits-their
practical effect is that officers will simply stop admitting that
race motivated an arrest. 09 If officers can easily conceal the use
of race, motions to suppress are unlikely to succeed at removal
hearings. 10 Moreover, the changes that have taken place in
100 745 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984).
101 See id. at 545-46.
102 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994).
103 See id. at 1449-51.
104 See id. at 1451.
105 38 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 1994).
106 Id. at 492.
107 See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1115 n.9 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bowley,
435 F.3d 426, 430-31 (3d Cir. 2006); Verduzco-Contreras v. Gonzales, 160 F. App'x
406, 408 (5th Cir. 2005); Rampasard v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 147 F. App'x 90, 92 (11th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2005).
108 See Almedia-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234-37 (2d Cir. 2006).
109 See Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note, The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza Reconsidered, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 843, 861 (1998) (suggesting that INS
agents will "conceal[] their use of race from courts").
110 See id. at 861, 872 (arguing that it is almost impossible to distinguish a race-
based stop in immigration enforcement, since racial factors pervade almost all
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immigration enforcement over the past two decades have
increased the likelihood that aliens will find themselves victims
of constitutional violations-race-based or otherwise. These
immense changes to the substance, enforcement, and process of
immigration law mandate expanding the current "glimmer of
hope of suppression"11 ' to a full-fledged application of the
exclusionary rule in removal proceedings.
II. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION
A. Politics, Policy, and the Immigration Problem: Changes in
the Substance of Immigration Law
Concern over the illegal immigration problem grew in the
decade following Lopez-Mendoza, resulting in a stricter
enforcement policy. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 ("IRCA")112 signaled the rising status of immigration as a
prominent political issue and the increasing concern that illegal
aliens were adversely impacting the country. 1 3  The IRCA
granted conditional amnesty to certain aliens, imposed sanctions
on employers who hired undocumented workers, and prioritized
the enforcement of immigration laws.114  The sharp debate
between pro- and anti-immigrant factions that had led to the
compromise bill" 5 continued in the following years as calls for an
even tougher stance against illegal aliens grew louder." 6 In
stops); see also Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 237 (holding that an alien who "offers
nothing other than his own intuition to show that race played a part in the arresting
agent's decision" will fail to trigger exclusion).
111 Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2004).
112 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.).
113 See Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & Mary Ann Nelson, Immigration Reform and the
Simpson-Rodino Act: A Legislative History of the Reform and Control Act of 1986
(P.L. 99-603) with Related Documents and Secondary Sources, 22 INT'L J. LEGAL
INFO. 12, 13 (1994).
114 See id. at 12-13; Steve Sosa, An Introduction to Search and Seizure Under
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 10 CHIcANO L. REV. 33, 45-46
(1990) (expressing concern that the IRCA's broadening of enforcement power could
erode Fourth Amendment rights).
115 See Reams & Nelson, supra note 113, at 16-17 (describing the "growing anti-
alien feelings in the border states" and the more "liberal concern[s]" that dictated
the law's final form and passing).
116 See Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms
and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 629-31 (2003) (discussing the
motives for the IRCA and noting the "renewed sense of crisis that lead [sic] Congress
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1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act ("AEDPA") 117 and the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA")." 8 These laws
expanded the list of crimes for which non-citizens, including
lawful permanent residents, faced mandatory detention and
deportation, 1" 9 and limited relief traditionally available to those
who were in removal proceedings. 120 By the late 1990s, then,
many commentators had announced the dawn of
"crimmigration"121: the immigration system's embrace of the
"severity revolution,"122 the "convergence [of] the criminal justice
and deportation systems,"'123 and the general emergence of a
harsher and more criminally punitive regime to combat the
perceived border "crisis.'1 24
The legal reaction to the tragic events of September 11th,
2001, further clouded the distinction between criminal and non-
to take Draconian measures against undesirable, 'criminal' aliens a decade later").
117 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
118 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
119 See Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and
Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 84-85 (2005);
Amy Langenfeld, Comment, Living in Limbo: Mandatory Detention of Immigrants
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, 31 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1041, 1044-45 (1999) (expressing concern over the possibility that many aliens
could face indefinite detention under the new laws).
120 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 & n.7 (2001) (noting that the AEDPA
revoked review for deportation orders for aggravated felonies, drug convictions,
certain weapons and national security violations, and multiple crimes of moral
turpitude, and that the IIRIRA narrowed the class of aliens who may be granted
cancellation of removal by the Attorney General). While the INS initially argued
that these limitations applied retroactively to aliens previously convicted through
plea agreements, of aggravated felonies, the Supreme Court disagreed. See id. at
326.
121 This term generally describes the "importation of criminal categories,
processes and techniques into the regulation of immigrants," but may in fact fail to
capture the truly unique, dynamic interaction between the two areas of law. See
Miller, supra note 116, at 616-20 (describing the "legal landscape" and documenting
scholarly works on the topic).
122 See Miller, supra note 119, at 83. Miller describes the "severity revolution" as
a break from traditional values in the field of criminal punishment, including the
promotion of the "severity of punishment as an overarching good." See id. at 83 &
n.6.
123 Id. at 83.
124 See Chac6n, supra note 12, at 1839-40 (describing prevalent public belief in
the connection between immigration and crime, despite a lack of empirical support);
Miller, supra note 116, at 613 & n.8.
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criminal aliens-while sharpening the divide between all aliens
and the rest of society125-by pulling immigration enforcement
under the umbrella of the war on terror. Immigration law
became an important tool in this new conflict because of its
higher tolerance for enforcement tactics based on ethnicity and
citizenship. 126 The Absconder Apprehension Initiative ("AAI"),
for example, targeted aliens with outstanding warrants of
removal; officials focused particularly on "priority absconders"
from countries "in which there ha[d] been Al Qaeda terrorist
presence or activity."127 Similarly, the National Security Entry-
Exit Registration System ("NSEERS")128 established a procedure
for interviewing, fingerprinting, and photographing non-
immigrant males from designated Muslim and Arabic
countries. 129 Lastly, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 allowed the
government to detain non-citizens without charge "in the event of
an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance."1 30 In many
respects, these initiatives simply continued the zero-tolerance
approach to immigration enforcement that existed prior to the
attacks. 31 Alien populations were now viewed as double-threats,
though-unwanted for their simple presence in the country as
well as for harboring potentially violent terrorists in their midst.
125 See Miller, supra note 119, at 112-13.
126 See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 385-86 (2006).
127 See Miller, supra note 119, at 87-88; see also Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified
in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (authorizing positions to be used for the
apprehension of fugitive aliens); Deputy Attorney General Releases Internal
Guidance for 'Absconder'Apprehensions, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 261, 261 (2002).
128 8 C.F.R. § 264.1 (2008).
129 See Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated
Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 67766 (Nov. 6, 2002). The NSEERS program has been
replaced in part by US-VISIT, which subjects all non-immigrants entering the U.S.
to photographing and fingerprinting. See Requirements for Biometric Identifiers
from Aliens on Departure from the United States, 8 C.F.R. § 215.8 (2008);
Enrollment of Additional Aliens in US-VISIT, 71 Fed. Reg. 42605 (July 27, 2006) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 215, 235); Notice to Nonimmigrant Aliens Subject to be
Enrolled in the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
System, 69 Fed. Reg. 482 (Jan. 5, 2004). "[C]ertain nonimmigrant alien visitors from
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen are [still]
subject to NSEERS registration," however. U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (Oct. 15, 2007),
http://www.ice.gov/pi/faqs.htm.
130 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2008).
131 See Miller, supra note 119, at 87.
11732008]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
B. Engorged Enforcement and Pared-Down Process
The "criminalization" that underlies these substantial
developments in the law has also augmented the enforcement
and process of typical immigration violations. 132 This change
took place structurally with the transfer of immigration duties
from INS to the newly created Department of Homeland Security
in 2003.133 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which
established the new agency, was enacted to "mobilize and
organize our nation to secure the homeland from terrorist
attacks."1 34  One of the primary reasons for DHS's structural
breadth was to "provide the unifying core for the vast national
network of organizations and institutions involved in efforts to
secure our nation."'3 5 Bringing the former INS under DHS's
umbrella, therefore, strengthened the already popular notion
that a "focused effort from our entire society" was needed to ward
off the dangers posed by illegal immigrants. 36 This collective
effort, steeped in the vocabulary of a dynamic struggle against a
predatory foe, transgresses the civil notions of administrative
compliance that once governed the immigration system.
1. The New Enforcement Regime
The two main enforcement bodies under DHS-Immigration
and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and U.S. Customs and Border
Patrol ("CPB")-are practically indistinguishable from criminal
law enforcement organizations.1 37  Border Patrol agents, for
example, can "conduct surveillance, pursue suspected
undocumented aliens, make stops, and effectuate arrests.' 3 8
ICE, which combines the investigative and intelligence arms of
the former INS as well as the "resources, responsibilities and
authorities" of the Federal Protective Service, is DHS's largest
investigatory unit. 39 As the agency itself proclaims, its name
132 See Stumpf, supra note 126, at 376, 381.
133 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 6, 18, 44, and 49 U.S.C.).
134 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURING OUR HOMELAND: U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC PLAN 9 (2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHSStratPlanFINAL_spread.pdf.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See Stumpf, supra note 126, at 387.
138 Id.
139 See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
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"belies the scope of its authority and activities," which in fact "go
far beyond the[] stereotypical concepts" of immigration and
customs enforcement. 140  Even within the first of these
traditional fields, ICE has focused on "[r]e-[i]nventing
[i]mmigration [e]nforcement" with "creative immigration
enforcement tools," leading to a sevenfold increase in the number
of criminal and administrative arrests since INS's last full year
of operation. 141 The crime of illegal reentry after deportation, for
example, is now the most prosecuted offense by the Los Angeles
U.S. Attorney's office. 142
ICE's Fugitive Operations Unit illustrates the "evolving
symbiosis between criminal law enforcement and immigration
regulation."1 43 The Unit's primary goal is "to identify, locate,
apprehend, process, and remove fugitive aliens from the United
States with the highest priority placed on those fugitives who
have been convicted of crimes." 144 The teams meet this goal by
engaging in traditional police activity such as raiding houses
containing alleged fugitives, often in pre-dawn hours while the
residents are asleep. 145 The number of arrests made by the unit
doubled in 2006 and again in 2007.146 On October 3, 2007, for
example, ICE announced that it had netted over 1,300
SEC., ICE FISCAL YEAR 2006 ANNUAL REPORT: PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY
AND UPHOLDING PUBLIC SAFETY 2 (2007) [hereinafter ICE FISCAL YEAR 2006
ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/ICE-06AR.pdf.
140 Id. As examples of its "broad scope of operations," ICE cites its role in
combating terrorism and safeguarding children from "pedophiles, human traffickers,
international sex tourists and other predatory criminals." Id. at 2-3.
141 See id. at 7-8, 11.
142 See Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., Largest-ever ICE Operation Targeting Criminal Aliens and Illegal
Alien Fugitives Nets More than 1,300 Arrests in Los Angeles Area (Oct. 3,
2007) [hereinafter ICE Operation], http://www.ice.gov/pilnews/newsreleases/articles/
071003losangeles.htm.
143 See Miller, supra note 119, at 94.
144 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-07-34, AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT'S
FUGITIVE OPERATIONS TEAMS 4 (2007) [hereinafter OIG ASSESSMENT OF ICE
FUGITIVE OPERATIONS TEAMS], http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_07-
34_.Mar07.pdf.
145 See Nina Bernstein, Immigration Raids Single Out Hispanics, Lawsuit Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, at B3; Sandra Forester, Immigration Raids Spark Anger
in Sun Valley Area, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 21, 2007, at 1.
146 See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., ICE FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM (2007) [hereinafter FUGITIVE PROGRAM],
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/nfop_fs.htm.
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individuals in the largest enforcement initiative in the unit's
history. 147 The unit's scope and reach seem unlikely to slow down
in the near future.148
2. Expedited Removal, Detention, and the Punitive Nature of
Deportation
The evolution of immigration procedure likewise reflects an
increasing emphasis on eradication of threat and punishment of
offenders-the same indicators of a criminal justice system. One
facet of ICE's "creative" new approach to enforcement and
removal, for example, has been the use of expedited removal
proceedings for "other-than-Mexican (OTM) aliens" found close to
the border, ending the so-called "catch and release" practice and
"eliminating the time spent litigating to a final order of removal
before immigration judges."'149 An emphasis on expediency over
process was similarly evident in the Justice Department's 2006
mandate that the Board of Immigration Appeals issue single-
member affirmances without opinion. 150 DHS's efforts at "re-
engineering the detention and removal system" to remove aliens
"from the country quickly and efficiently"' 5' highlight another
trend-the increasing use of detention as an immigration
sanction. 52  In addition to the expanded use of non-citizen
detention without bond for suspected terrorists 153 and regular
criminal aliens in removal proceedings, 154 DHS now detains
permanent residents, women, and children that it formerly
147 See ICE Operation, supra note 142.
148 See FUGITIVE PROGRAM, supra note 146 ("Given the success of the fugitive
operations effort, ICE is proposing to add six more Fugitive Operations Teams in
fiscal year 2008.").
149 See ICE FISCAL YEAR 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 139, at 11.
150 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2008); Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice,
Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of Immigration Appeals's Summary
Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 481, 500-01 (2005) (describing the
"devastating" changes at the BIA).
151 ICE Operation, supra note 142.
1-52 See Stumpf, supra note 126, at 391.
153 See Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree: Detention Without Bond in
Immigration Proceedings, 50 LOY. L. REV. 149, 158-61 (2004) (discussing the INS's
post-9/11 implementation of detention without bond for terrorism suspects under
both section 412 of the PATRIOT Act and section 236(c) of the INA).
154 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (holding that detention of a
criminal alien during removal proceedings, without an individualized bond hearing,
is constitutionally permissible); Taylor, supra note 153, at 162-63, 166-69.
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released 155 and imposes incarceration as a penalty for the act of
entry itself.156 Detention is even mandatory for many asylum
seekers entering the country. 157 With a focus on incapacitation,
increased detention for immigration violators mirrors the
punitive nature of the criminal justice system. 158
Deportation is perhaps the "most 'criminalized' sector of
immigration law" and a key tool in the larger focus on
maximizing social control over alien populations. 15 9  The
recognition that the banishment of an individual from his or her
home, family, and employment embodies consequences similar
to-if not in excess of-incarceration is not new. 16 0 The category
of deportable aliens, however, has greatly expanded in the past
decade, and now includes even long-term lawful permanent
residents.' 61 Accompanying this change is the increasing use of
deportation as a crime-reducing tool, supplanting the traditional
justification of maintaining the legitimacy of the immigration
system. 16 2 An individual who committed a misdemeanor twenty
years ago, for example, yet has lived a productive and positive
life since then, marrying and having American-citizen children,
can now face deportation for the decades-old crime. 163
Deportation has grown to serve important incapacitation,
deterrent, and retributive functions in the new security-
155 Stumpf, supra note 126, at 391; see also Lara Yoder Nafziger, Protection or
Persecution?: The Detention of Unaccompanied Immigrant Children in the United
States, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLy' 357, 381 (2006) (noting a 2003 Amnesty
International study "found that approximately one-third of all detained
unaccompanied juveniles encountered 'harsh conditions in a secure jail-like facility
designed for the incarceration of juvenile offenders' ").
156 See Miller, supra note 116, at 617 (noting also that "heavy fines and
forfeiture of property" are used to punish entry).
157 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2000); Kristen M. Jarvis Johnson,
Fearing the United States: Rethinking Mandatory Detention of Asylum Seekers, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 589, 619 (2007) ("Detention isolates asylum seekers from the outside
world and degrades them to the level of criminals facing punishment.").
158 See Miller, supra note 116, at 631, 657-58.
159 See Miller, supra note 119, at 98-99.
160 See In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 95 (B.I.A. 1979) (Appleman,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[O]ne cannot ignore the severe
consequences of deportation in some cases, and its analogy to a criminal
sanction .... ).
161 See Kanstroom, supra note 48, at 1893-94.
162 See id. at 1892.
163 See Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least
Some of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 5 BENDER'S
IMMIGR. BULL. 475, 475 (2000).
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immigration paradigm. 164 This convergence with criminal law
suggests the need for a reevaluation of whether the
constitutional safeguards that apply in that context should apply
in deportation proceedings as well. 165
C. Circling the Wagons166: State and Local Involvement in
Immigration Enforcement, Recent Initiatives, and the
Heightened Risk of Constitutional Violations
Perhaps the sharpest change in immigration enforcement
that the system's realignment has brought about-and pertinent
to Fourth Amendment concerns-is the involvement of state and
local police in investigating and apprehending immigration
violators. Some localities have actively sought out this power;167
the Department of Justice ("DOJ") has prodded others to make
immigration enforcement a priority.168 This was not always so.
In 1996, the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") issued an
opinion concluding that states had the power to enforce criminal
provisions of the immigration laws, but did not haxe the
authority to detain aliens for civil violations. 69 Then, in 2002,
the OLC secretly revised its 1996 opinion and concluded that
states in fact had the inherent authority to enforce civil
provisions of immigration laws. 70 This about-face coincided with
the INS beginning to enter civil immigration information into the
National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"). 171 When state or
local police run an NCIC check on an alien with an outstanding
warrant during a routine traffic stop, for example, an
Immigration Violator File "hit" will alert the officer to verify with
16 See Kanstroom, supra note 48, at 1894.
165 See id.; Pauw, supra note 163, at 475.
166 See Remarks on Operation Wagon Train, supra note 3.
167 See IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., ICE AGREEMENTS OF COOPERATION IN COMMUNITIES TO ENHANCE SAFETY AND
SECURITY: ICE ACCESS 1 (2007), available at http:lwww.ice.govldoclib/pi/news/fact
sheets/accessfactsheetv3l.pdf. (describing the ICE Agreements of Cooperation in
Communities to Enhance Safety and Security (ACCESS) program and noting
"widespread interest from local law enforcement agencies").
168 See Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration
Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1087 (2004).
169 See Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Dep't of Justice, 339 F. Supp. 2d 572, 575
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
170 See id. at 576.
171 See Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Gonzales, 468 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
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DHS, and then detain or arrest the alien until DHS arrives to
take custody. 172  This new "inherent authority" has raised
concerns that officers will engage in unlawful racial profiling by
stopping and detaining individuals they suspect of being illegal
immigrants based solely on their appearance. 173
On top of NCIC-based apprehensions, state and local police
have assisted ICE in large-scale roundups such as Operation
Return to Sender, 174 a nationwide initiative that resulted in the
arrest of over 2,100 individuals. 175 Smaller initiatives-such as
Operation Crosscheck 176 in Minnesota-have become prevalent at
the local level, involving extensive collaboration with police
officials to identify and apprehend targets. 177 These initiatives
were tied in with the executive branch's recent announcement of
a "crackdown" after political consensus failed to materialize over
172 See id. at 434.
173 See Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 95 F. Supp. 2d
723, 733, 737 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (finding that the plaintiffs in a class action suit
lacked standing to enjoin the highway patrol from interrogating motorists regarding
immigration status based on their Hispanic appearance, but that they did establish
a prima facie case of race discrimination under the equal protection clause), aff'd in
part, 308 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2002); Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487, 500, 503
(W.D. Tex. 1992) (granting a preliminary injunction against El Paso Border Patrol
due to "stops, questioning, detentions, searches, arrests, verbal and physical abuses,
harassment, and humiliation based upon [U.S.] citizens' and residents' mere
Hispanic appearance"); Wishnie, supra note 168, at 1102-15 (detailing the risk of
racial profiling by state and local police, and noting two pre-9/11 studies which
suggested that officials "frequently resorted to stereotypes and discrimination" in
routine immigration enforcement); Carrie L. Arnold, Note, Racial Profiling in
Immigration Enforcement: State and Local Agreements to Enforce Federal
Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 119-21 (2007) (documenting evidence of
racial profiling in the "Chandler Roundup," a five-day joint operation between local
police and border patrol agents).
174 See ICE FISCAL YEAR 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 139, at 25; OIG
ASSESSMENT OF ICE FUGITIVE OPERATIONS TEAMS, supra note 144, at 26-28.
175 See Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., ICE Apprehends More than 2,100 Criminal Aliens, Gang Members,
Fugitives and Other Immigration Violators in Nationwide Interior Enforcement
Operation (June 14, 2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release_0926.
shtm.
176 In hockey, a cross-check involves shoving the other player with the stick held
between both hands; the violent move can result in a game misconduct. See NHL
RULEBOOK R. 50 (2005-2006 ed.), available at http://www.nhl.com/hockeyu/rulebook/
rule50.html. The former INS has a similar history of dubious operation-naming. See
Christopher J. Walker, Border Vigilantism and Comprehensive Immigration Reform,
10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 135, 142-43 (2007) (describing "Operation Wetback").
177 See Complaint at 12, Arias v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 07-
0 1959 (D. Minn. Apr. 19, 2007).
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proposed immigration reform. 178  As political reconciliation
remains elusive, state and local participation in immigration
enforcement continues to increase. 179
While the stated purpose of many of these inter-agency raids
is to apprehend "aliens with unexecuted Warrants of Removal or
Deportation and other identified criminal aliens,"1 80 evidence
suggests that officials sometimes target particular ethnic
communities,181 and that the individuals swept up are not the
fugitives or criminals identified on warrants. According to the
Office of the Inspector General's Assessment of the Fugitive
Operations Teams, the local police "typically only provide support
through their uniformed presence and do not participate in
apprehensions or the interview process.' 8 2  In reality, local
participation can also facilitate the targeting of undesirable
racial or ethnic communities.18 3 By directing federal authorities
to target destinations, local police can quell public discontent
over encroaching alien populations by effectively cleansing their
neighborhoods of immigrants.184
This development, in conjunction with ICE's overly
aggressive tactics, is problematic for both legal aliens and U.S.
citizens of particular ethnic and racial backgrounds, who may
find themselves targets of community frustration and
consequently victims of illegal searches and seizures. Latino
families living legally in New York, for example, filed a class
action lawsuit in September of 2007 alleging that ICE agents had
178 See Robert Pear, Bush Plans Immigration Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2007, at A10. The initiative embodied familiar themes: workplace compliance, border
security, and hunting down fugitive "alien absconders" and street gang members. Id.
179 See Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., Jim Pendergraph Selected as ICE's State and Local Coordinator:
Newly Created Senior Executive Position to Emphasize Public Safety Cooperation
and Coordination (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/
071002washington.htm.
180 Reply at 5, Arias v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 07-01959 (D.
Minn. Apr. 25, 2007).
181 See Democracy Now!: 750+ Immigrants Detained in "Operation Return To
Sender" Raids (NPR radio broadcast Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.democracynow.org/
2007/4/27/750 immigrants detainedinoperationreturn.
182 OIG ASSESSMENT OF ICE FUGITIVE OPERATIONS TEAMS, supra note 144, at
26.
183 See Jury Demand at 8-12, Flores-Morales v. George, No. 07-0050 (M.D.
Tenn. July 27, 2007); Bernstein, supra note 10.
184 See Raids Make Bad Situation Worse, supra note 10 ("Ihe raids carry a
perception of political show, to satisfy the strident voices claiming that illegal
immigrants are stealing jobs and committing crimes against U.S. citizens.").
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conducted abusive pre-dawn raids on their homes, refused to
show warrants, and told one family's twelve-year-old daughter
that they would "be back" to get her.18 5 The complaint alleged
that the "unstated goal of these raids [was] to gain access to
constitutionally protected areas in the hope of seizing as many
undocumented persons as possible."18 6 Similarly suspect raids-
of homes, workplaces, and otherwise-have recently occurred
across the country.18 7
III. REWEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
The current trend of overzealous immigration enforcement is
alarming. Readopting the exclusionary rule-an "essential
part"188 of the Fourth Amendment-is one step toward crafting a
more law-abiding, humane, and reasonable immigration policy.189
185 See Class Action Complaint at 15-16, 18-21, 23-25, 27-28, Aguilar v.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 07-8224 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007).
186 Id. at 3-4.
187 See Complaint at 2, 13, 15-18, Barrera v. Boughton, No. 307-01436 (D. Conn.
Sept. 26, 2007) (alleging that a local police officer, driving a pickup truck, promised
eleven Hispanic men work, then drove them to an enclosed field where ICE arrested
them; alleging also a pattern and practice of race-based traffic stops to check Latino
drivers' immigration status); Original Complaint at 10-11, United Food &
Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 4825029 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12,
2007) (No. 2-07CV-188-J) (alleging mass Fourth Amendment violations during the
Swift Raids); Complaint for Violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the
United States Constitution at 1-4, Reyes v. Alcantar, No. 07-2271 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
26, 2007) (alleging ICE violated a seven-year-old U.S. citizen's Fourth Amendment
rights by detaining him after a home raid); Jury Demand at 2, 8-14, Flores-Morales
v. George, No. 07-0050 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 26, 2007) (alleging local and federal
collaboration in using warrants for "suspects" as a pretext for rounding up and
driving out Hispanic residents of the community); Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 2, Arias v. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, No. 07-1959 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 2007) (alleging Fourth
Amendment violations stemming from warrantless raids of Latino homes in
Willmar, MN, during "Operation Crosscheck"); Nina Bernstein, Promise of ID Cards
Is Followed by Peril of Arrest for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at
B1 (describing accusations that ICE retaliated against a municipal ID plan in New
Haven by conducting illegal raids); Tyche Hendricks, The Human Face of
Immigration Raids in Bay Area: Arrests of Parents Can Deeply Traumatize Children
Caught in the Fray, Experts Argue, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27, 2007, at Al (describing the
constitutional questions raised by Operation Return to Sender); Associated Press,
Groups Question Immigration Raid in Central Idaho, AP Alert-Idaho, Sept. 22,
2007, 9/22/07 APALERTID 01:11:37 (Westlaw) (describing pre-dawn home raids).
188 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
189 See Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Reform: A Civil Rights Issue, 3 STAN. J.
Civ. RTS. & Civ. LIBERTIES 157, 164 (2007) ("Robust legal protections and rights for
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The Lopez-Mendoza Court explicitly left open the possibility that
the "exclusionary rule's value might change, if there developed
good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS
officers were widespread." 190  As the above-cited cases
illustrate, 191 the criminalization of immigration law has
facilitated a decline in concern over Fourth Amendment
compliance, potentially presenting the type of situation that the
Lopez-Mendoza plurality contemplated. While empirical proof of
"widespread" Fourth Amendment violations may be forthcoming,
it is not a necessary prerequisite for readopting the exclusionary
rule. Rather, the changes wrought on the immigration system
have redefined the entire context in which individuals are sought
out, apprehended, and removed-and in which the Lopez-
Mendoza majority initially analyzed the rule's effectiveness. This
altered landscape requires a reweighing of the rule's deterrent
benefits and social costs, which leads to the conclusion that the
exclusionary rule should once again apply in removal
proceedings.
A. Stare Decisis, Changed Conditions, and Overruling INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza
While stare decisis generally dictates adherence to decided
cases, it is not "'a universal, inexorable command,' especially in
cases involving the interpretation of the Federal Constitution."'192
Rather, it is the Supreme Court's "duty to reconsider
constitutional interpretations that depar[t] from a proper
understanding of the Constitution" and to "bow[] to the lessons of
experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the
process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is
appropriate also in the judicial function."'193 Overruling a case is
appropriate when the prior judicial ruling is clearly seen as
error. 94  Many share this view of Lopez-Mendoza.195  Several
immigrants are essential, but none will endure unless the foundation of judicial
review and enforcement is guaranteed.").
190 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).
191 See supra notes 180, 185, 187 and accompanying text.
192 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954 (1992) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
193 Id. at 955 (internal quotation marks omitted).
194 Id. at 854 (plurality opinion).
195 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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"prudential and pragmatic considerations" may also inform the
Court's weighing of the costs of overruling and reaffirming a
prior case. 196 These considerations include whether the rule is
practically unworkable; whether society has come to rely on the
rule and would suffer "special hardship" if repudiated; whether
the law relating to the rule has changed so as to render the rule
"abandoned doctrine"; and whether the rule's underlying facts
"have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification." 197
The facts underlying Lopez-Mendoza have drastically
changed. The crux of the majority's decision was the perception
of deportation as a "purely civil action."198  While some still
perceive deportation as such,1 99 the overwhelming evidence
shows that the removal of aliens has, for all practical purposes,
become incarceration's bedfellow. 200 Similarly, the validity of the
assumption that constitutional compliance can be entrusted to
enforcement officials alone has withered with the immigration
system's comprehensive adoption of the criminal law
paradigm. 20 1 These changes, along with several others described
in the following sections, have robbed Lopez-Mendoza of its
justification and compel overruling the case.
Reliance on Lopez-Mendoza is not sufficiently strong to
support the case's survival. DHS would likely argue that it has
reasonably relied on the rule's absence and would suffer
institutional hardship if forced to change investigatory,
apprehension and removal procedures. In reality, however, the
exclusionary rule would simply compel DHS to comply with the
Fourth Amendment-what the agency's own safeguards
ostensibly already ensure. 20 2 The application of the rule in the
criminal context has shown that it is not a barrier to effective law
enforcement, and any argument against its "handcuff[ing]" effect
is simply an argument against the Fourth Amendment itself. 20 3
196 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 854.
197 Id. at 854-55.
198 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
199 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)
(arguing that deportation is not a punishment).
200 See Kanstroom, supra note 48, at 1894-95; supra Part II.B.2.
201 See infra Part III.B. 1.b.i.
202 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
203 See LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 1.2(a) ("The exclusion of evidence is only the
sanction which make8 the rule effective. It is the rule, not the sanction, which
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Indeed, the expansion of the "egregious" exception, as well as the
rule's existence prior to Lopez-Mendoza, shows that exclusion is
workable in the immigration context.
B. Analyzing the Exclusionary Rule's Costs and Benefits
Reversal is an admittedly difficult task in light of the
Supreme Court's recent lack of enthusiasm over the exclusionary
rule. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott 20 4 and
Hudson v. Michigan,20 5 for example, suggest that the rule should
be the "last resort, not [the] first impulse."20 6 Hudson, which
considered the rule's applicability to "knock and announce" rules,
emphasized its "substantial social costs"2 7-"setting the guilty
free and the dangerous at large," as well as interfering with
"truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives"-and cited the
Court's recent cautiousness in approaching application. 208
Despite such guarded -language, the test for applicability remains
the same as in 1984. Suppression of illegally obtained evidence
through the exclusionary rule is appropriate when "its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served"209 -in other
words, when the rule's "deterrence benefits outweigh its
substantial social costs." 210  Examining the circumstances
surrounding removal proceedings leads to the conclusion that the
exclusionary rule would prevent Fourth Amendment violations
by immigration officials, and that this deterrence outweighs the
rule's social costs.
1. Deterrence Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule
A calculation of the deterrence benefits of the exclusionary
rule in removal proceedings involves a balancing test of its own.
First, the likelihood of deterrence must be estimated by looking
at the methods and context for alien apprehension and
processing. One must then tailor that determination by looking
imposes limits on the operation of the police.").
204 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
205 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
206 Id. at 591.
207 Id. at 590-91 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)).
208 Id. at 591.
209 Scott, 524 U.S. at 363 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974)).
210 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (quoting Scott, 524 U.S. at 363) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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at several factors that could potentially dampen the rule's
effectiveness. Overall, deterrence is not significantly diminished
by these factors, and the exclusionary rule emerges as an
effective promoter of Fourth Amendment compliance in
immigration enforcement.
a. The Likelihood of Deterrence
Since "the value of deterrence depends upon the strength of
the incentive to commit the forbidden act, '211 the "intrasovereign"
violation that occurs when an immigration official unlawfully
apprehends an alien presents the exact situation in which the
rule is most likely to be effective. 212  A violation is
"intrasovereign" when "the officer committing the
unconstitutional search or seizure [is] an agent of the sovereign
that [seeks] to use the evidence." 213 Here, DHS tasks agents with
the investigation and apprehension of aliens and subsequently
seeks to use that information in removal proceedings. An
unlawful immigration arrest is therefore not only
"intrasovereign," but also "intra-agency."214
Aside from agency mechanics, the exclusionary rule's
effectiveness rests on the premise that enforcement officers care
about prosecutions and convictions. 215 As the Lopez-Mendoza
majority recognized, an arresting immigration officer's "primary
objective" will almost always be to gather information for a
deportation proceeding. 21 6 This "zone of primary interest"21 7 is
parallel to a police officer's-the risk of having the suspect's case-
in-chief fall apart due to exclusion deters Fourth Amendment
violations no less in immigration investigations than in criminal
investigations. 21 8 In this sense, the central role that deportation
211 Id. at 595.
212 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043 (1984).
213 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 (1976).
214 Bernard A. Nigro, Jr., Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Administrative
Proceedings, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 564, 588 (1986).
215 See LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 1.2(b).
216 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043.
217 Janis, 428 U.S. at 458.
218 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1053 (White, J., dissenting) ("Civil
deportation proceedings are in no sense 'collateral.'... [B]ecause civil deportation
proceedings are to INS agents what criminal trials are to police officers, I cannot
agree [that application of the rule in such proceedings is unlikely to provide
significant deterrence]."); In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 97 (B.I.A. 1979)
(Appleman, concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[IWf the evidence is barred in
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proceedings play in immigration enforcement distinguishes the
situation from Janis and Calandra, which rested on the
reasoning that exclusion in a collateral proceeding would not add
any additional deterrence when exclusion in a criminal
proceeding already deterred.219 In fact, the exclusionary rule
might be a more effective deterrent for ICE agents than for
ordinary law enforcement officers, since ICE is now mandated to
ensure that "every alien who has been ordered removed departs
the United States as quickly as possible."220  Immigration
enforcement and removal are inextricably intertwined, providing
fertile ground for the exclusionary rule to alter behavior.221
This conclusion is not altered by the shift in enforcement
priorities that occurred with the birth of DHS in 2003.222 ICE's
main objective, for example-to "protect America and uphold
public safety by targeting the people, money and materials that
support terrorist and criminal activities" 223-suggests that the
majority of ICE agents are focusing on potential terrorists and
predatory criminals. If this were true, and if such targets were
being tried in criminal proceedings, exclusion of evidence in
removal proceedings might not provide significant "additional"
deterrence.224
the civil deportation proceedings, the consequences are grave enough that the
deterrent effect is equivalent to that in a criminal proceeding stemming from the
same breach of the law."); Nigro, supra note 214 ("The connection between those who
illegally obtain evidence and those who seek to use it in subsequent proceedings
could not be more direct than the connection present in the context of deportation
proceedings .... This identity of purpose substantially increases the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule.").
219 See LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 1.3(b).
220 See ICE FIsCAL YEAR 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 139, at 9.
221 While many argue over the empirical evidence supporting the rule's
deterrent effect, a widely regarded study of the Chicago Police Department and the
city's court system found that the rule "dramatically improved police behavior."
Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary
Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. CO. L. REV. 75, 132 (1992).
222 DHS's official mission is to "deter terrorist attacks and protect against and
respond to threats and hazards to the Nation." U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
SECURING OUR HOMELAND: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC
PLAN 4 (2004), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHSStratPlan_
FINAL.spread.pdf.
223 ICE FISCAL YEAR 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 139.
224 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443, 448 (1976) (stating that the
rule is unnecessary in a civil tax proceeding because local law enforcement officials
are already deterred by the possible exclusion of evidence in state and federal
criminal trials).
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DHS's professed mission, however, does not match its actual
enforcement record. In the last three years, only 0.0015% of the
individuals that DHS charged had claims of terrorism brought
against them. 225 Similarly, officials brought "national security"
charges against only 0.014% of those individuals. 226 Rather, the
vast majority of individuals that DHS apprehended were charged
with ordinary immigration violations, such as entering without
inspection.227 The agency's frequent drumbeat against predatory
crime also appears exaggerated. In fact, the proportion of cases
involving criminal charges in Immigration Court actually
decreased by ten percent between 1996 and 2006.223 In contrast,
the total proportion of immigration charges during this same
time period rose by over ten percent. 229 DHS's "zone of primary
interest,"230 therefore, continues to be the apprehension and
removal of individuals illegally present in the United States.
Moreover, to the extent that DHS has focused on bona fide
terrorists and criminals, the agency has turned to immigration
law and proceedings as catch-all enforcement and prosecution
tools. 231 Suppression of evidence at removal proceedings would
therefore effectively deter DHS agents in the majority of their
enforcement activities.
b. Evaluating the Strength of Deterrence-Reducing Factors
The fact that the exclusionary rule is best suited for the
immigration context needs to be weighed against several factors
that potentially reduce the rule's deterrent effect. According to
the Lopez-Mendoza majority, four factors outweighed the
likelihood that the exclusionary rule would actually deter
constitutional violations: (1) the INS had its own method of
deterring Fourth Amendment violations, (2) immigration officials
could sometimes prove alienage-and secure deportation-
without relying on evidence obtained from an arrest, (3) few
225 TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT: THE RHETORIC, THE REALITY (2007), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigrationlreports/178/. Of the fourteen terrorism charges brought against the
twelve individuals during this time span, only four were sustained. Id.
226 Id.
227 See id.
228 See id.
229 Id.
230 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976).
231 See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
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aliens actually challenged the lawfulness of their arrest, and
(4) alternative remedies were available. 232 As Justice White
pointed out in his dissent, however, none of these factors
presents a "principled basis" to distinguish the rule's deterrent
effect in criminal proceedings from its effect in deportation
proceedings. 233 An analysis of each of these factors in light of the
changes that have altered the immigration landscape similarly
fails to alter the conclusion that the rule is an effective deterrent.
i. The Insufficiency of Institutional Self-Restraint
The belief that the INS's own procedural safeguards were
sufficient to accomplish the rule's purpose-"perhaps [the] most
important" factor in the Court's deterrence analysis234-
continues to be incorrect. Despite praising the INS's disciplinary
scheme, the Court could not point to a single incident in which
the agency had actually punished an agent who had committed a
Fourth Amendment violation.235 Similarly, while educational
programs did exist to instruct agents in Fourth Amendment law,
Justice White pointed out that their existence was evidence of
the exclusionary rule's effectiveness, not a reason to abandon
it.236
After Lopez-Mendoza, it is hard to see why immigration
officials would comply with the Fourth Amendment on their own
volition.23 7 The consumption of immigration enforcement duties
by the Department of Homeland Security has reaffirmed the
conclusion that training and self-policing are insufficient
deterrents to constitutional violations. DHS took over an agency
whose internal complaint mechanisms already suffered
deficiencies, such as jurisdictional overlap, lack of transparency,
insufficient resources, and a lack of community outreach. 238 The
232 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
233 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1053 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
234 See id. at 1044-45 (majority opinion).
235 Id. at 1054 (White, J., dissenting).
236 Id. at 1055; see also Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85,
129 (1984) ("Eliminating the exclusionary rule because law enforcement agencies
have instituted administrative mechanisms for punishing [F]ourth [A]mendment
violations is like cutting off a diabetic's insulin supply because his illness seems to
be under control.").
237 See Nigro, supra note 214, at 589.
238 See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Keeping an Eye on the I.N.S.: A Case for Civilian
Review of Uncivil Conduct, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 9-10 (1994). The author noted that ten
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increasing preference for security and expediency over adherence
to traditional constitutional mandates suggests that sufficient
self-restraint is even less likely under DHS's watch.
An analysis of DHS's internal constitutional safeguards
confirms this. Responsibility for constitutional compliance
within the department is statutorily delegated to the Office for
Constitutional Rights and Civil Liberties ("CRCL"). 23 9  The
CRCL's mission is "to assist the dedicated men and women of
[DHS] in securing our country while preserving our freedoms and
our way of life. '240 The CRCL has four main objectives: (1) to
provide proactive advice to help shape policy, (2) to investigate
complaints by the public against department officials, (3) to
provide leadership regarding equal employment opportunity
programs, and (4) to serve as an information and communication
liaison with the public. 241 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004242 clarified CRCL's role,
mandating that the President appoint the head of the CRCL and
expanding the office's oversight and investigatory abilities. 243
While the creation of CRCL is certainly a step in the right
direction, a closer inspection of its training and disciplinary
mechanisms raises doubts that the current system sufficiently
deters constitutional violations. 244
On the educational level, constitutional compliance
initiatives appear cosmetic. The CRCL created a "Civil Liberties
University," which provides educational training to Department
employees through computer programs and the Internet. As an
example of such training, CRCL noted the availability of a twelve
years earlier, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights had acknowledged "serious
problems in the INS complaint review procedures." Id. at 3. Almost none of the
Commission's recommendations, however, had been implemented. Id.
239 See 6 U.S.C. § 345(a)(4) (Supp. IV 2004).
240 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2005-2006 1 (2007), available at http://www.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/crcl-fy0506annualreport.pdf.
241 Id.
242 Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.).
243 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
supra note 240.
244 As a preliminary matter, the CRCL had only twenty positions one year after
its creation; thirteen of these were dedicated to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Program. See Daniel W. Sutherland, Office for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Sec., Remarks at the Heritage Foundation Lecture (July 1, 2004),
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0505.shtm.
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minute web and computer-based training video on basic Arab-
American and Muslim-American culture, a twenty-five minute
tutorial to commemorate Constitution Day, several "educational
posters," and an hour-long training session on how to interact
with Muslim Americans. 245 CRCL's Congressional Report failed
to mention, however, whether the hour and thirty-seven minutes
of training-not counting poster-viewing time-was mandatory,
instead remarking that the programs were "accessible." 246
Concern over the mandatory nature of such training, of course,
presumes that its substance actually deters constitutional
violations. To the contrary, CRCL acknowledged that an
instructor in a course on Muslim and Arab culture taught by a
"DHS Component" "painted a picture in which all Arab
Americans and Muslim Americans [were] potential terrorists."247
This type of incident, while obviously an anomaly, highlights the
"startling" implication of the Lopez-Mendoza majority's
conclusion that courts should "defer to law enforcement officers'
superior understanding of constitutional principles. 248
DHS's investigatory and disciplinary mechanisms have
similarly failed to deter constitutional violations. Aside from the
CRCL, complaints of misconduct by immigration officials can be
directed to ICE's Office of Professional Responsibility ("OPR"),
OPR field offices, or DHS's Office of the Inspector General
("OIG"). 249  Even if investigators substantiate misconduct,
however, serious discipline is unlikely. After the creation of
DHS, for example, ICE failed to provide the OIG with the
disciplinary status of Reports of Investigation ("ROI"), leading to
concerns that substantiated allegations of employee misconduct
"were not receiving timely or effective attention with a probable
erosion of good discipline. '250 A subsequent review confirmed
that ICE's discipline procedures suffered several deficiencies,
including lack of a central tracking system for reports of
245 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
supra note 240, at 27-28.
246 Id. at 27.
247 Id. at 39.
248 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1058 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
249 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-06-57, A
REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT DISCIPLINE PROCEDURES 4
(2006) [hereinafter OIG REVIEW OF ICE DISCIPLINE PROCEDURES], available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG-06-57_AugO6.pdf.
250 Id. at 1-2.
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misconduct, unexplained delays in processing substantiated
complaints, and a lack of consistency in the proposal and
application of penalties. 2 1 Officials adjudicated only twenty-nine
percent of the ROIs completed between January 2003 and August
2005, for example. 252  The longer a substantiated complaint
lingers, the harder it becomes to justify significant
punishment,253 lessening any deterrent effect the system might
have. Moreover, the possibility that similarly situated officers
within the same unit could engage in similar misconduct, yet
receive different penalties, 254 suggests that officers do not have a
clear sense of the consequences that a constitutional violation
may bring. Indeed, in this type of "'good old boys'
network... certain infractions were simply made to go away. 255
While the report cited planned improvements, the problems
illustrate the lethargic manner in which agencies can be expected
to develop effective self-disciplinary remedies. This institutional
inertia is especially pronounced in the immigration context.
First, there is little incentive to change course when overly
aggressive and improper enforcement accomplishes DHS's goals.
In some instances, institutional self-interest can be augmented
through the political process. 256 Aliens, however, are almost
completely disconnected from representational politics, and
therefore have little say in enforcement policy.
ii. Proving Alienage Without Investigatory Evidence
While the removal of some aliens without the use of
investigatory evidence does decrease the likelihood of deterrence,
it does not completely diminish the rule's deterrent effect.
Admissible evidence could potentially include subsequent
voluntary admissions of alienage or independently obtained
documents proving removability, including birth certificates
251 See id. at 8.
252 Id. at 1-2.
253 See id. at 11. One case, for example-involving the "Phoenix Five"-took four
to five years to adjudicate, without a sufficient explanation for the delay. Id.
254 See id. at 13.
255 Id. at 17.
256 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949) (noting that "the internal
discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion" served as an
alternative remedy to Fourth Amendment violations by state police officers
(emphasis added)), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2008] 1191
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
indicating foreign birth. 257 The situation is analogous to criminal
proceedings, however, when conviction is often possible despite
suppression of illegally obtained evidence. 258 While the rule may
not deter violations in every situation, "the effort to depreciate
[their] worth makes [such violations] less of an incitement than
[they] might be." 259 The absence of the rule, on the other hand,
allows the government to pay "premium prices for evidence
branded with the stamp of unconstitutionality."260
Moreover, the strength of this deterrent-reducing factor
depends on how broadly one interprets Lopez-Mendoza's
statement that "[t]he 'body' or identity of a defendant or
respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself
suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest."261 The Eighth and
Tenth Circuits, for example, have held that this language means
simply that an individual may not challenge a court's jurisdiction
over his or her body.262  Lopez-Mendoza therefore does not
foreclose challenges to the admissibility of "identity-related
evidence. '263 Such evidence obtained subsequent to an illegal
search and seizure will come into trial only if it is sufficiently
attenuated "to be purged of the primary taint" of the Fourth
Amendment violation. 264 The government's ability to secure
removal despite an illegal search and seizure, therefore, is far
from guaranteed. Lastly, an increase in the government's ability
to secure removal can simply be viewed as a decreased social
cost.
2 6 5
257 See Henry G. Watkins, The Fourth Amendment and the INS: An Update on
Locating the Undocumented and a Discussion on Judicial Avoidance of Race-Based
Investigative Targeting in Constitutional Analysis, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 572-
82 (1991).
258 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1054 (1984) (White, J., dissenting)
("[Iln many [criminal] cases even though some evidence is suppressed a conviction
will nonetheless be obtained.").
259 LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 1.2(b), at 35.
260 Id.
261 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039 (majority opinion).
262 See United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2001). But see
United States v. Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1994) (denying
suppression of an individual's identity or government files).
263 Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1111.
264 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
265 See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 236, at 128.
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iii. Voluntary Departure, Expedited Removal, and Challenging
Unlawful Arrests
The infrequency of alien challenges to unlawful arrests
similarly fails to compel the conclusion that the exclusionary rule
would not significantly deter Fourth Amendment violations. As a
preliminary matter, any current lack of challenge is undoubtedly
a result of the rule's absence; logic dictates that the rule's
presence would increase the number of motions to suppress. As
with proving alienage, the fact that some aliens might still elect
voluntary departure-or will have no opportunity to challenge
their arrest due to expedited removal 266-is analogous to criminal
proceedings, when the overwhelming prevalence of plea
bargaining ensures that only a small percentage of prosecutions
will reach the trial stage.267 Moreover, while the majority of
aliens continue to depart voluntarily, the percentage of formal
removal proceedings has steadily increased over the past ten
years. 268 The number of voluntary departures in 2005 was
approximately six percent greater than in 1984, the year Lopez-
Mendoza was decided; the number of formal removals, on the
other hand, grew by over 1,000 percent. 269 Formal removal
proceedings now account for approximately one-fifth of all aliens
expelled. 270 Most of the aliens who do elect voluntary departure
are Mexican nationals caught at the border.271  Similarly,
expedited removal is only used for aliens arriving at the border or
port of entry, or those who are encountered close to the border
within fourteen days of entry.272  While border enforcement
266 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
267 See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 698 (2002) (noting
that more than ninety percent of all criminal prosecutions determined on the merits
are convictions, with more than ninety percent of those resulting from guilty pleas);
Yale Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53
J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 171, 179 (1962) (noting that the California
Attorney General believed that the overwhelming number of pleas stemmed from
the rule's refreshing effect on constitutional compliance).
268 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 16 (2006) [hereinafter CRS REPORT],
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33351_20060406.pdf.
269 See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC.,
2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95 tbl.38 (2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/OIS-2005_Yearbook.pdf.
270 See id.
271 See id. at 96 tbl.39 & n.2.
272 See CRS REPORT, supra note 268, at 11.
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presents Fourth Amendment concerns of its own, it is distinct
from the type of internal community-based enforcement that has
become more prevalent in recent years. A border patrol officer is
almost guaranteed a positive outcome; an ICE officer raiding a
factory or entering an alien's home, on the other hand, is much
more likely to worry about the possibility of exclusion.
iv. The Adequacy of Alternative Remedies
While the Court has shown an increasing preference for civil
and criminal suits as deterrents, as well as reliance on the
increasing professionalism of police forces, aliens can rely on
neither. As Hudson noted, "the sins and inadequacies of a legal
regime that existed almost half a century ago"273-including lack
of relief under civil rights statutes 274 and cases such as Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics275-
have been largely remedied for U.S. citizens. Aliens do not enjoy
the fruits of this judicial renaissance. First, unlike criminal
defendants, aliens who have been illegally apprehended and
removed from the country are "in no position to file civil actions
in federal courts."276 Second, immigration officials are unlikely to
be scared by the proposition of suits from aliens who remain
illegally in the country, since many are poor, uneducated, do not
speak English, lack access to legal assistance, and are hesitant to
assert themselves in such a public manner. 277 Finally, DHS has
not demonstrated the sort of professionalism the Hudson
majority presumed sufficient to constrain constitutional
violations-which in any case is likely a product of the
exclusionary rule.278
Reliance on these remedies is insufficient because both the
institution that requires deterrence and the political forces that
dictate policy can prevent the plans from being put into place, or
can turn safeguards into mere paper procedures. 279 This concern
is particularly apparent in immigration enforcement because
273 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006).
274 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
275 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
276 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1055 (1984) (White, J.,
dissenting).
277 See id.
278 See infra note 319 and accompanying text; supra Part III.B.l.b.i.
279 See Kamisar, supra note 14, at 138; Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 848-49 (1994).
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aliens are disconnected from the political process. 280  The
exclusionary rule, on the other hand, "is a remedy that judges
control and can apply 'without being dependent upon the actions
of other branches of government.' "281 This independence ensures
integrity in judicial decisions and the legal system at large. The
exclusionary rule, of course, need not shove these alternative
remedies to the side. Rather, the rule can work in conjunction
with them to create a more stable deterrent framework.
The inadequacy of alternative remedies is, in fact, strong
support for the rule's necessity. The most compelling evidence
for the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect, some have argued,
can be seen in state police forces' reactions to Mapp v. Ohio.28 2
Following application of the federal exclusionary rule in Weeks,
the states had five decades in which to develop any rule they
desired to control police activity, yet "not one of the twenty-four
states that still admitted illegally seized evidence on the eve of
Mapp had developed an effective alternative to the rule."28 3
Rather, Mapp "create[d] tidal waves and earthquakes," 284
requiring top to bottom retraining to those engaged in basic
enforcement functions, as if police forces and prosecutors "had
made a belated discovery that the [F]ourth [A]mendment
applied" to them.28 5 Application of the exclusionary rule in
removal proceedings would create similar tremors throughout
DHS-a catalyst for significant institutional change in Fourth
Amendment compliance.
2. The Exclusionary Rule's Social Costs
The potential social costs of suppressing probative evidence
of guilt must be weighed against the likelihood that the
exclusionary rule would deter Fourth Amendment violations.
The Lopez-Mendoza majority raised several legitimate concerns,
280 See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
281 Kamisar, supra note 14, at 138 (quoting Morgan Cloud, Judicial Review and
the Exclusionary Rule, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 835, 838 (1999)).
282 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
283 Kamisar, supra note 14, at 127.
284 Id. at 124 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Michael Murphy, Police
Commissioner of New York City at the time Mapp was decided). Kamisar notes that
the reactions of William Parker, the Los Angeles Chief of Police, and Arlen Specter,
then an assistant district attorney in Philadelphia, were quite similar. Id. at 125.
285 Id. at 124 (quoting Richard Uviller, a prosecutor at the time Mapp was
decided).
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including judicial sanctioning of continuing violations of
immigration law and complications in administrative and
enforcement procedures. 2 6  While the exclusionary rule is
admittedly far from perfect, the insufficiency of the alternatives
demonstrates that it is also the "only game in town."28 7  The
protection of individual liberty always entails acceptance of some
costs, 288 but analysis shows that they are not as severe in the
instant case as the Lopez-Mendoza majority believed.
a. Direct Costs
i. Letting Aliens Free and Condoning Continuing Crimes
The most frequent argument against the exclusionary rule-
and one that the Lopez-Mendoza majority saw as a major
contributor to the situation's "unusual and significant" social
costs 28 9 -is that "[t]he criminal is [let] free because the constable
has blundered. '290 Several studies in the criminal sector have
found that the percentage of lost cases due to suppression,
though, may not be very high.291 Moreover, the highly visible
nature of the process may actually benefit the system by allowing
courts a window into the practical consequences of their
constitutional jurisprudence. 292 In this sense, the rule serves to
check a counter-majoritarian judiciary who might otherwise over-
restrict police conduct, resulting in a doctrine in harmony with
the necessities of practice. 293 This is particularly true in the
immigration context, when the unique role of race and ethnicity
in enforcement, as well as the frequency and confusion of mass
arrests, make constitutional line-drawing more difficult. 294 The
exclusionary rule lets some criminals walk free, but only to
create a more fine-tuned system that does a better job of
"protect[ing] the privacy of us all. ' 295
286 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
297 See Steiker, supra note 279, at 851.
288 See id. at 820.
289 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984).
290 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
291 See Kamisar, supra note 14, at 131 & nn.58-59.
292 See William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 443, 448 (1997).
293 Id. at 447; see also LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 1.2(a), at 28.
294 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1049-50; Hafetz, supra note 109, at 861-66
(describing immigration officials' use of race in stopping individuals).
295 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987); see also Potter Stewart, The Road
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The fact that a released alien would immediately continue
violating the immigration laws does distinguish removal from
regular criminal procedures. Even if society must accept the
occasional sanctioning of a continuing crime, however, letting a
status296 criminal go free imposes far less cost than letting a
murderer, rapist, or other violent criminal back onto the
streets. 297 In this sense, the choice between lawbreaking police
and lawbreaking aliens 298 is easier in the immigration setting.
Allowing some aliens to remain in the country illegally, where
they have potentially strong family, economic, and community
ties, seems a fair trade for ensuring individual liberties for the
entire population. Maintaining these community bonds in order
to effectively combat more serious crimes makes this tradeoff
even more worthwhile. 299 The exclusionary rule is intended to
protect society as a whole-not the alien in whose case the rule
applies.300 Although the wrongdoer is the most immediate and
visible beneficiary, the larger systemic benefits render this cost
acceptable. 301
ii. Administrative Inconvenience
Arguments citing administrative incapacity and
inconvenience are similarly unpersuasive. Before Lopez-
Mendoza, when courts and lawyers assumed that the
exclusionary rule applied to deportation proceedings, the
immigration system had little problem handling cases. 30 2 In the
to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1393
(1983) (noting that catching fewer criminals was a "price the framers anticipated
and were willing to pay to ensure the sanctity of the person, the home, and property
against unrestrained governmental power").
296 See United States v. Mejia, 278 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60 (D. Mass. 2003) (noting
that the goal of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 was to deter recidivism, and remarking that the
reason for initial deportation has no bearing on the nature of the offense); see also In
re Sandoval, 17 1. & N. Dec. 70, 81 (B.I.A. 1979) ("We do not suggest that the 'cost' of
an alien's continued unlawful presence is in any way comparable to the 'cost' of
allowing a criminal to go free .... ).
297 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006) (noting the "grave adverse
consequence[s] ... of releasing dangerous criminals into society" (emphasis added)).
298 See Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment:
The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 330 (1973).
299 See infra notes 314-319 and accompanying text.
300 See Dworkin, supra note 298, at 330-31.
301 See id.
302 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1058-59 (White, J., dissenting)
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years following Lopez-Mendoza, courts have adjudicated motions
to suppress the fruits of "egregious" Fourth Amendment
violations.30 3  While immigration judges currently face
overwhelming caseloads and less than adequate resources, 30 4 the
optimal solution to these problems is to strengthen agency
resources-not to ignore untidy problems. Similarly, the
contention that it is "administratively inconvenient" for DHS
agents to distinguish constitutional violations because of the
"crowded and confused circumstances" that surround many ICE
arrests305-"perhaps the most outrageous aspect of the [Lopez-
Mendoza] decision"306 -amounts to a rejection of the Fourth
Amendment itself rather than a rejection of the exclusionary
rule.30 7  Crafting a workable system for the courts and
enforcement officials is certainly not an easy task. But
[t]he concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional
protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when
they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates
otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish
would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and
undermine the basis of our government. 30 8
Given the importance of the Fourth Amendment, such
subordination of constitutional rights to expediency constitutes
plain neglect of duty.30 9
b. Cost-Reducing Factors and Indirect Costs
Several factors further lessen the cost of suppressing
evidence. First, the Lopez-Mendoza majority failed to take into
account the good faith exception to the rule explicated in United
States v. Leon310 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard.31' The
("The simple fact is that prior to 1979 the exclusionary rule was available in civil
deportation proceedings, and there is no indication that it significantly interfered
with the ability of the INS to function.").
303 See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text.
304 See Nina Bernstein, New York's Immigration Courts Lurch Under a Growing
Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, § 1, at 1; Julia Preston, Wide Disparities Found in
Judging of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at Al.
305 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1059; id. at 1049-50 (majority opinion).
306 LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 247.
307 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1059 (White, J., dissenting).
308 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (plurality opinion).
309 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1060.
310 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
311 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
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exception dictates that "the exclusionary rule should not be
applied when the officer conducting the search acted in
objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached
and neutral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be
invalid."3 12 Similarly, several of the deterrent-reducing factors
cited by the Lopez-Mendoza majority can actually be categorized
as cost-reducing factors because of the dampening effect they
have on the likelihood of suppression. The infrequency of
motions to suppress prior to 1979, for example, is testimony to
the small likelihood of vast numbers of "criminals" walking free.
The fact that removability can sometimes be proven without
resort to evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure
likewise lessens the rule's negative impact. 313
The most significant social costs involved in the analysis
emanate not from the rule's presence, but from its absence.
Recent home and workplace raids have terrorized immigrant
families, forcing many into hiding and destroying trust in law
enforcement officials. 314 Similar reactions have resulted from
local ordinances directed at illegal immigrants, 315 raising both
economic and safety concerns. First, intimidating enforcement
campaigns can seriously hurt business owners and the wider
communities in which aliens live. 31 6 Second, the hostility that
accompanies home and workplace raids can hamper more
important law enforcement objectives by destroying the bonds
that local officers have developed with immigrant populations.317
This results in diminished cooperation with the police, making it
more difficult to solve violent crimes. 318
In New York, for example, local police and county officials
were so disturbed by the aggressive and undisciplined tactics of
ICE officers that they withdrew support midway through a joint
anti-gang operation and wrote a letter to DHS Secretary Michael
312 Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 987-88.
313 See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 236, at 128.
314 See Susana Enriquez, Families Protest Immigration Raids, NEWSDAY, Sept.
28, 2007, at A21; Forester, supra note 145.
315 See Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Town Rethinks Laws Against Illegal
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at Al.
316 See id.; Steven Greenhouse, Immigrant Crackdown Upends a
Slaughterhouse's Work Force, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at Al.
317 See Megan Matteucci, Deportation Fears Hinder Police Investigations,
SAVANNAHNOW, Oct. 7, 2007, http://new.savannahnow.com/node/371509.
318 See id.
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Chertoff requesting an investigation into "serious allegations of
misconduct and malfeasance." 319  Among the allegations were
that ICE agents refused to check arrest targets with local police
intelligence files, had incorrect or outdated addresses for ninety
of the ninety-six warrants for street gang members, sought a
twenty-eight-year-old defendant using a photograph of the boy
taken at age seven, displayed a "cowboy" mentality, and drew
their weapons on local officers. 320  This type of overzealous
enforcement exposes residents and officers to immediate physical
danger and undermines long-term community cooperation.
CONCLUSION
While innovative strategies, techniques, and institutions are
undoubtedly necessary to counter the new problems facing our
nation, the tendency to segregate and vilify that has
accompanied the immigration system's recent transformations is
neither necessary nor wise. As the country continues to debate
immigration's proper role in our social, cultural, and political
framework, we must pay special care to crafting an approach
that ensures optimal protection for the values and ideals that
define our nation. The criminalization of immigration-with a
zero-tolerance approach to the eradication of national security
threats and the maintenance of an identifiable American
culture-presents one side of this concern. The tendency to pull
up and tighten the covers of the American social fabric, however,
can also have the unfortunate effect of blinding us to the
deterioration of the very same values and liberties we seek to
protect.
The exclusionary rule's absence from removal proceedings
invites immigration officials to disregard the Fourth
Amendment. This invitation has become increasingly attractive
as the immigration problem-and the enforcement apparatus
319 See Nina Bernstein, Immigrant Workers Caught in a Net Cast for Gangs,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, § 1, at 41; Nina Bernstein, Raids Were a Shambles,
Nassau Complains to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at B1 [hereinafter Bernstein,
Raids Were a Shambles]; Press Release, Thomas R. Suozzi, Nassau County
Executive, Suozzi and Mulvey Call for Federal Investigation of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Raids in Nassau (Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Suozzi and
Mulvey Call for Federal Investigation], http://www.nassaucountyny.gov/agencies/
CountyExecutive/NewsRelease/2007/10-2-2007.html.
320 See Bernstein, Raids Were a Shambles, supra note 319; Suozzi and Mulvey
Call for Federal Investigation, supra note 319.
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created to solve it-have grown over the past two decades. The
drastic changes that compel a reexamination of the exclusionary
rule also dictate the opposite outcome to the cost-benefit analysis
that INS v. Lopez-Mendoza engaged in over twenty years ago.
Readopting the exclusionary rule will have a profound effect not
only on the mechanics of government operations, but also on the
way in which we view the alien in society. Neither change will be
easy, but the landscape that emerges will provide more liberty
for us all.
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